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Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: The Am.bulance at the Bottom
of the Corporate Fraud Cliff
jacob Strain*

Offering Chapter 11 bankmptcy privileges to to!pat'dtiom that have gone bad
because offimtdulent activity actttaliy i11cmtse:s the incentives and opportzmities for cmporations to become involved in corpomte fimltl.

lying over the Boca Raton Resort in Florida offers one a good opportunity to observe an enormous luxury home being built by Scott Sullivan,
he former chief financial officer of the WorldCom corporation that recently
iled che largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy in U.S. history. Since being indicted
with falsifying WorldCom's accounting books by more chan 3.8 billion dollars, Sullivan has been rushing to complete his family's mansion before his
erial is finished. Under a Florida state law called Homestead Exemption,
am ily homes are protected from creditors so long as rhey are occupied. If
Sullivan were to declare bankruptcy, he would doubtlessly keep the "lavish
15 million dollar estate, complete with a movie theater and six jacuzz.is." 1
As the Homestead Exemption Law is working for Scott Sullivan, Chapter 11 bankruptcy laws allow corporations involved in corporate fraud to retain their own corporate "jacuzzis" and "movie cheaters"-despite their
fraudulent activiry. In fact, according to the FDIC, the largest Chapter 11
filings in history (including WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia
Communications, ImClone Systems, Tyco International, Dynegy, Computer

F

* Jacob Strain, from Fore Worth, TX, is an economics major. He was married
in May 2002 to Elodia, whose supporr in rh is projecr was invaluable.
1 Simon English, "Former executive faces charges over WorldCom," Daily Telegraph, Augusr 29, 2001 , available from lmp:f/www.dailyrelegraph.co.uk/money/
main.jhtml?xml=lmoney/2002/08/29/cnwcom29.xml&sSheet=lmoney/2002/08/29/
ixciry>; (accessed November 2, 2003).
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Associates, Qwest, and dozens of other companies) were all consequences of
corporate fraud. ~
These corporations have all fallen off che corporate fraud cliff and have
entered into the Chapter 11 ambulance. Without attaclcing the ethical implications of corporate liabiliry, the purpose of this research is to show that
offering Chapter 11 bankruptcy privileges to corporations that have gone
bankrupt because of fraudulent activiry actually increases the incentives and
opportunities for corporations to become involved in corporate fraud. Furthermore, this research will explore possible solutions to this problem and
determine if American business can be trusted.
THE PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY LAWS

The infamous Chapter 11 bankruptcy code is a series of laws passed by
Congress in 1978 whose original purpose was to dispel the confusion offormer corporate bankruptcy laws. These new laws have allowed bankrupt corporations ro continue operating and avoid liquidation. Corporations who
file for Chapter 11 are given court protection from their creditors so that
they are able to reorganize the company with a plan to meet their financial
obligations. The petition for Chapter 11 includes a schedule of debts, assets,
and income potential. After the chapter is filed, a judge supervises a reorganization process of the company.~ The regular management of the
corporation runs the everyday business operations, but all significant decisions must be authorized by the bankruptcy court.• In some cases the company is saved, creditors are repaid, workers remain employed, shareholders
stay safe, pension plan holders are protected, and the economy as a whole
benefits. In these successful cases, Chapter 11 is an ideal method for saving
a good company that has run into bad luck.

1 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "Large and Small Companies
Exhibit Diverging Bankruptcy Trends," January 31, 2002, available from
lmp://www.fdic.gov/bank/analyrical/~'i/f}ri0131 02.hrml (accessed November 12,
2003).
$ United States CodeAm10tated, BankruptcyTitle II, Section 1101 (1993).
• Securirics Exchange Commission, "What Every Investor Should Know abom
Corporate Bankruptcy," 2003, available from hnp://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
bankrupr.hrm; (accessed November 13, 2003).
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CHAPTER 11 UNDERMINES THE MONETARY CONSEQUF.NCF~<i OF FRi\UD

Unfortunately, Chapter 11 has become the everyday method for saving
companies whose distress results from shady business practices. "A natural
and characteristic consequence of fraud is monetary damage because criminal conduct can cause a healthy company to fall into financial despair."~ Yet,
allowing corporations involved in fraud to enjoy the protection of Chapter 11
bankruptcy suppresses those monetary consequences which act as an important deterrent of fraud. Ironically, one of the best ways ro deter a corporate
scandal is by permitting one of its rypical consequences-financial ruin.
Criminologists agree that monetary consequences are an effective means
of deterring corporate fraud . This assumption is based on the belief that corporate criminal activiry is a pro6t-motivated behavior and can best be deterred by monetary punishment. In this regard, Chapter 11 bankruptcy
creates an extensive problem. For example, the Enron scandal resulted in the
second largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy in U.S. history. Under its Chapter 1 I
bankruptcy reorganization plan, the Enron corporation will pay crediwrs
less than one-fifth of the estimated $67 billion they are owed.<- Offering
Chapter 11 bankruptcy w corporations that have debts incurred from corporate swindling greatly removes the deterring monetary consequences of
their illegal actions.
Despite the evidence that Chapter I 1 bankruprcy undermines the natural monetary consequences of fraud, bankruptcy laws uphold that the
chapter should be offered to businesses involved in corporate crime based on
the assumption that there are £\VO kinds of debt: debt incurred ftom fraud
and legitimate debt. It is believed that an incriminated corporation should
be able to receive coun protection for legitimate debt just as a nonincriminated company would. Under the current laws, debts generated from

' David E. Rovella. "Executives elude charges," Bloomberg News, August 20,
2003, 2, available from http://www.bayarea.com/images/componcntlropsrory_from
rhe_rxr.gif; (accessed November 2, 2003).
.
'' Margaret P. Spencer, "A Look at Margaret P. Spencer and Ronald R Stms, eds.,
Corporate Crime," in Corporate Mi;condttct: The Legal. Societal, and Management
lsmes, ed. Margaret P. Spencer and Ronald R. Sims (Wesrporr, c-r: Quorum Books.
1995), 28.
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These corporations have all fallen off che corporate fraud cliff and have
entered into the Chapter 11 ambulance. Without attacking the ethical implications of corporate liability, the purpose of this research is co show that
offering Chapter 11 bankruptcy privileges to corporations that have gone
bankrupt because of fraudulent activity actually increases the incentives and
opportunities for corporations to become involved in corporate fraud. Furthermore, this research will explore possible solutions to this problem and
determine if American business can be trusted.
THE PuRPOSE OF CHAPTER

11 BAI"KRUPTCY lAWS

The infamous Chapter 1 J bankruptcy code is a series of laws passed by
Congress in 1978 whose original purpose was co dispel the confusion of former corporate bankruptcy laws. These new laws have allowed bankrupt corporations to continue operating and avoid liquidation. Corporations who
file for Chapter 11 are given court protection from their creditors so that
they are able to reorganize the company with a plan to meet their financial
obligations. The petition for Chapter 11 includes a schedule of debts, assets,
and income potential. After the chaprer is filed, a judge supervises a reorganization process of the company.3 The regular management of the
corporation runs the everyday business operations, but all significant decisions must be authorized by the bankruptcy court.• In some cases the company is saved, creditors are repaid, workers remain employed, shareholders
stay safe, pension plan holders are protected, and the economy as a whole
benefits. In these successful cases, Chapter 11 is an ideal method for saving
a good company chat has run into bad luck.

1 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "Large and Small Companies
Exhibit Diverging Bankruptcy Trends," January 31, 2002, available from.
http://w\V'.v.fJic.gov/bank/analyticaJ/fYi/fYiO 131 02.hrml (accessed November 12,
2003).
' United States Codt Amwtnted, Bankruptcy Title Il, Section II 0 I (1993).
• Securiries Exchange Commission, "What Every Investor Should Know about
Corporate Bankruptcy," 2003, available from http://\V\vw.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
bankrupt.hrm; (accessed November 13, 2003).
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11 UNDERMINES THE MONETARY CONSEQUENCES OF FRAUD
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second largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy in U.S. history. Under its Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization plan, the Enron corporation will pay creditors
less than one-fifth of the estimated $67 billion they are owed.(. Offering
Chapter 11 bankruptcy to corporations that have debts incurred from corporate swindling greatly removes the deterring monetary consequences of
their illegal actions.
Despite the evidence that Chapter 11 bankruptcy undermines the natural monetary consequences of fraud, bankruptcy laws uphold that the
chapter should be offered to businesses involved in corporate crime based on
the assmnption that there are two kinds of debt: debt incurred ftom fraud
and legitimate debt. It is believed that an incriminated corporation should
be able to receive court protection for legitimate debt just as a nonincriminated company would. Under the current laws, debts generated from

~ David E. Rovella. "Executives elude charges," Bloomhag News, August 20,
2003, 2, available from hrrp://www.bayarea.curn/images/componcnrlropstory_from
.
the_rxt.gif; (accessed November 2, 2003).
" Margaret P. Spe-ncer, "A Look at Margaret P. Spencer and Ronald R S1ms, eds.,
Corporate Crime,.. in Corporate Misconduct: The Legal. Socittnl, and Managemem
lsmes, ed. Margarc£ P. Spencer and Ronald R. Sims (Wesrporr, C1: Quorum Books,
1995). 28.
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fraudulent or criminal actions are not dischargeable and remain owed to the
creditor.7 However, in most cases, judgments of chargeable debts incurred
from misconduct are grossly understated.
Once corporate misconduct has occurred, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between debt incurred from rhe offense and from legitimate debt.
In the case of World Com, the corporation found itself $30 billion in debt
because of fraudulent activity, yet the court fines based on debt produced
from misconduct were only $750 million.~ It is highly improbable that with
a total debt of chat magnitude, resulting primarily from corporate misconduct, only 2.5 percent of the debt resulted from fraudulent behavior. In
many instances, corporations like \'V'orldCom are permitted to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy even when much of their debt has been generated by nusconduct. Though Chapter 11 laws obligate businesses to pay their debts
contrived from wrongdoing, there is little evidence that such debts are being
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Regulation is essential in the prevention of corporate fraud. Toby
Bishop, president and chief executive officer of the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners, discusses a fundamental approach to dealing with corporate fraud: "We need to focus on improving our prevention and detection
measures to reduce the chance of it [fraud] occurring and to catch it sooner
when it does occur, as it inevitably wilt."~ Ideally, corporations themselves
would rake such prevention and detection measures.

Many business professionals agree that d1e most effective way to regulate fraud within a corporation is the through a Human Resource Management (HRM) program. For most corporations, the HRJ\.1 personnel
determine whether a company develops an ethical or unethical climate.H'
HRM departments place great emphasis on policies and programs that compel employees to exhibit ethical behavior while protecting the corporation
from criminal activity. 11 HRM tasks include employee screening and selection, employee training, establishing ethics codes, creating employee reward
svsrems, developing whistle-blowing policies, creating and maintaining ethi~ working conditions, and firing employees.
However, Chapter 1 J bankruptcy hinders the development of selfregularory programs in many firms by providing companies involved in
fraud with a safety ner. As stated in a legal dictionary under bankruptcy,
"The concept [behind Chapter 11] is to give someone a fresh start, bur it has
often led to careless, profligate business operations and casual running up
bills with those giving credit being badly hurt by bankruptcies." 11 One of
the hazards of the availability of Chapter 11 bankruptcy (and bankruptcy in general) is the associated negligence. Chapter 11 bankruptcy
provides a safety net for incriminated corporations and can prompt other
corporations to rake higher risks for gain at a lower cost of losing.
One of the more common risks taken among corporations is the elimination or underfunding of self-regulatory programs such as the HRM. Firms
tend to cut funding of HRMs and other safety programs, particularly at
times when the business is struggling. Corporations may also feel that tl1ey
do not need co thoroughly self-inspect or regulate in defense of corporate
fraud in part because self-regulation is so costly and time consuming. The
corporation may rationalize that the likelihood of someone committing
fraud in the firm is slim, and as a last resort, the company can reorganize
under Chapter 11. With Chapter 11 as a support, corporations find it less
necessary ro regulate themselves in order to deter corporate misconduct.

Online Law Dictionary, "Bankruptcy," available from hHp://www.law.com;
(accessed November 13, 2003).
8 English, "Former Executive Faces Charges over WorldCom."
; Association of Cenified Fraud Examiners, "World's Largest Anti-fraud Body
Calls for New Actions m Fight Corporate Fraud," 2003, available at <http://wwvt.
cfenet.com/medialrdeases/071502.asp>; (accessed 10 November 2003).

'" Ronald R. Sims and Serbrenia J. Sims, "Countering Corporate Misconduct:
The Role of Human Resource Management," in Co1porate Misconduct: ll;e Legal,
Societal, and Management Issu.es. ed. Margaret P. Spencer and Ronald R. Sims (\'V'estporr, CT: Quorum Book~. 1995), 183.
II Ibid.
11 Online Law Oicrionary, "Bankruprcy."

paid.
.
Until fraudulent debts can be correctly calculated and collected, Chapter 11 bankruptcy privileges should be withheld from corporations liable for
fraud. In withholding rhese privileges, corporations would be motivated to
take more precautionary measmes in protecting tl1emselves against corporate
misconduct.
CHAPTER 11 UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE PREVENTATIVE MEASURES
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Because self-regulation programs are absent, the primary regulation of
fraud is conducted by the U.S. governmentY With an army of organizations, agencies, and programs, the U .S. government wages a war against
corporate fraud. There are roughly 14,000 companies overseen by a governmental agency called the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) . However,
with the recent increase in corporate fraud and the budget constraints of the
SEC, some argue that the government is not able to adequately deter corporate fraud.
As the government faces constraints and as self-regulation decreases, the
chance of corporate scandals gready increases. A wise saying explains that it
is better to have a fence at the top of a cliff than an an1bulance at the bottom. In this comparison Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the ambulance and corporate self-regulation and selt:.inspection are the fences. Though preven~on
and regulation seem less painful, trends indicate that more corporanons
are falling over the cliff of fraud and getting into the Chapter 11 ambulance.
Offering Chapter 11 bankruptcy to corporations involved in fraud decreases the an10unt of self-regulation and self-inspection of other corporations and increases the amount of corporate fraud because of enhanced
confidence in government bailouts in the f.'\ce of trouble.
Some would argue that Chapter 11 has no bearing on self-regulation because corporations will regulate themselves regardless of what bankruptcy is
offered by the courts. They claim that it is too detrimental to allow a firm to
bankrupt itself because of criminal activity, even if the government allows reorganization. Since Chapter I 1 is not foolproof and because its outcomes are
nor always favorable, some argue that corporations are not willing to take the
risk of flling for Chapter 11 bankruptcy; therefore, corporations would selfregulate even w ith the current laws.
Many believe bankruptcy is "just about the most serious and drastic financial measure that a business debtor could undertake" and that Chapter 11
bankruptcy is risky and cosrly. 14 According to this argument, corporatio.ns
have sufficient incentives to effectively self-regulate. However, the populanty
of the law among corporate America weakens this approach. In the sixteen.
n Sally S. Simpson, Co1porate Crime, Law, and Social Control (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
1• Benji 0 Anosike, How to File for Chapter II Bankruptcy Relieffi'om 11mr Business Debts with or without a Lawyer (New York: Do-Ir-Yourself Legal Publishers,
1983), 5.
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years since the effective date of this bankruptcy code, nearly 300,000 cases
have been filed under Chapter 11.n T hat is an average of 18,750 Chapter 11
bankruptcy filings per year. The fact that there are a large number of bankruptcy filings each year and the increasing frequency at which they occur, indicates that although there might be high risks or costs involved, Chapter 11
bankruptcy provides debtors with some remarkable benefits.
SOLUTION

In order to increase incentives for corporations to self-regulate and selfinspect against corporate crime, Chapter 11 bankruptcy should be wi~hheld
from corporations involved in criminal activity. This solution embodies the
criminologist "idea of punishing a group because it will turn its anger [regulation] on the wrongdoers in the midst." 16 Offering Chapter 11 bankruptcy
laws to corporations guilty of misconduct impedes the development of more
beneficial self-regulation progran1s. Consequently, Chapter 11 bankruptcy
availability to incriminated companies, perpetuates corporate fraud.
As d1is research has indicated, a possible solution is to withhold all
Chapter 11 bankruptcy benefits from corporations meeting financial disaster as a result of corporate fraud. And yet, the implications of this solution
are far reaching and seemingly harsh. This solution would create short-term
economic difficultv for those most directly linked to the failed firm. Those
possibly affected by such a collapse may include shareholders, investor~,
creditors, pension plan holders, employees, and the economy. However, this
short-term difficulty will lead to the deterrence of corporate fraud, and these
groups will benefit more substantially in the long-run. Under this system,
monetary consequences will be enforced, self-regulation plans will be enticed, long-run damages from fraud would be minimized, and society would
benefit immensely as a whole.

" Samuel Bufford, "Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: An
Empirical Study," American Bankruptq Institute Law Review 85 (November I, 2003,
LexisNexis database), 2.
' 6 Gilbert Geis and Joseph Dimenro, "Should We Prosecute Corporations
and/or Individuals?" in Corpomte Crime Contemporary Debates, ed. Margaret P.
Spencer and Ronald R. Sims (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1995), 80.
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Gilbert Geis and Joseph Dimenro, "Should We Prosecute Corporations
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Spencer and Ronald R. Sims (Toronro: University ofToronto Press, 1995), 80.
1
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Corporate misconduct can forcefully be addressed by selectively
withholding Chapter 11 bankruptcy rights. As incriminated corporations
lose protection, this will allow monetary repercussions and induced growth
of self-regulation programs co deter fraud. In this way, selectively withholding Chapter 11 bankruptcy will decrease incentives and remove opportunities for firms and individuals to become involved in corporate fraud.
As this discussion has demonstrated, there is no reason to accept billiondollar corporate scandals as a part of everyday life. Deceit is something
Americans do not have to live with. There is no justification for allowing
corporate fraud to damage our lives, our economy, or our nation. There are
solutions to rl1e problems of corporate America; they need only be implemented. The best way to prevent fraud is ro stop it before it starts. The best
time to reorganize a corporation is before it has been devastated by misconduct. Corporate America has reached a juncture where fences are needed instead of ambulances. Until these fences are soundly implanted, American
business cannot be trusted.

